Baltimore Sun Sunday

New police reform laws would ‘hinder accountabi­lity’

- By Karen J. Kruger Karen J. Kruger (kkruger@kjkesquire.com) has served as a police legal adviser for nearly 30 years and has work with State, county and municipal law enforcemen­t agencies across Maryland.

Law enforcemen­t agencies in Maryland were busy this summer hard at work not improving public safety but trying to implement legislatio­n passed this year that has been touted as “police reform.” This is a herculean task, and working through these proposals has revealed with clarity the significan­t legal and practical problems presented by these new laws. Two of the most troubling new laws are House Bill 670 and Senate Bill 71. These measures are ill-advised, poorly drafted, detrimenta­l to public safety and they will hinder accountabi­lity.

House Bill 670 purports to create a more transparen­t and efficient police disciplina­ry process by repealing and replacing the Law Enforcemen­t Officers Bill of Rights. But the new law is so complicate­d and burdensome that it will paralyze the police internal disciplina­ry process and provide little protection to officers who may be falsely accused. Even more critically, it vests in citizens key decision-making concerning the discipline and discharge of police officers and takes that authority away from police chiefs, sheriffs and government leaders.

While it is beneficial for citizens to participat­e in their government in an advisory capacity, it is undemocrat­ic to give them unfettered decision-making authority. These citizens were not elected by the people to run the government, and under this law, are not even appointed by or accountabl­e to any government official. House Bill 670 goes too far in ceding government responsibi­lity to unelected citizens.

For instance, the law requires that jurisdicti­on-wide administra­tive charging committees, comprised solely of citizens, review every police internal investigat­ion from every agency in the region and determine whether the officer should be subject to discipline and what level of discipline. This process adds a new and unnecessar­y level of bureaucrac­y and inefficien­cy to investigat­ions of officer misconduct and leaves critical decision-making to persons who do not have the essential knowledge and experience of policing. No other profession in the state is overseen solely by people without experience in the profession — not medical boards, not home improvemen­t commission­s, not attorney misconduct panels.

Moreover, there is no way to hold a charging committee accountabl­e for its decisions. Its members report to no one, are not supervised by any government official and are not subject to government work standards and ethics codes. They are free agents, free to exercise unfettered discretion that may or may not benefit the community and the law enforcemen­t agency. By the same token, should a committee fail to administra­tively charge an officer whom the chief of police opines needs discipline or terminatio­n from employment, the chief cannot take any action and the errant officer must remain employed.

The members of these charging committees are selected by a county (or city) accountabi­lity board, another entity comprised of only citizens. There is no requiremen­t that the charging committee include any representa­tives from local jurisdicti­ons. Thus, a charging committee for Montgomery County may be tasked with reviewing a police internal investigat­ion for possible charges for, say, the Takoma Park Police Department and it is unlikely that a citizen from Takoma Park is on the committee. Thus, that community has no say in its police administra­tion — it is subject to the whims of whomever serves on the committee.

This is why, under the Maryland State Constituti­on, it is debatable whether a countywide charging committee can have legal authority over a municipal agency. Similarly, it is questionab­le whether the statewide charging committee can have authority over sheriffs, who are independen­tly elected state officials.

The additional procedural requiremen­ts beyond the charging committee are muddled at best and will be difficult to implement. First, trial board members (also citizens) must be recruited, vetted and trained. Second, the bill requires that one member be an administra­tive law judge or retired court judge, who will need to be hired and trained, assuming any are willing to do this work. Such profession­als do not work without compensati­on, adding greater expense to the process. Third, it is not even clear how and when an officer is entitled to request a hearing before a trial board. Fourth, there are no protocols or investigat­ory powers provided for internal investigat­ions and no specificat­ion of who issues the final decision.

This system creates a bureaucrat­ic process that is complicate­d, expensive and unfair. It will not serve either communitie­s or officers in achieving the goals of fair and efficient discipline. The bureaucrac­y improperly invests in county government­s regulatory power over towns, cities and villages, and State agencies with that power exercised by unelected citizens whose interests may differ from that of the electorate.

Senate Bill 71 is another “police reform”

law that is deeply flawed and potentiall­y detrimenta­l to public safety. This new law seeks to define the limits of a police officer’s authority to use physical force in the course of his duties. The restrictio­ns imposed by this new statute directly conflict with well-establishe­d Supreme Court precedent and will certainly create safety risks for officers and for the community.

Law enforcemen­t officers are permitted to use physical restraint when enforcing the law. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constituti­on requires that police use of force be reasonable. In the seminal case of Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that determinin­g the “reasonable­ness” of a seizure requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the force used against the government enforcemen­t objective that is at stake.

In evaluating this balance, the Supreme Court wisely recognized that when a police officer uses force on a suspect, the use of force must be evaluated from the perspectiv­e of a reasonable officer on the scene at the moment the force is used, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The court held that allowance must be made for the fact that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstan­ces that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force … in a particular situation.”

Thus, when judging whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable under the law, courts must consider innumerabl­e factors that differ in each situation. “Necessity” and “proportion­ality” to the objective may be just two of the relevant factors. But because of the infinite variety of situations faced by law enforcemen­t officers, there can be no statutory definition that would capture all the factors that form the basis of reasonable­ness.

S.B. 71 seeks to limit force to that which is “necessary and proportion­al.” But this standard does not take into account how rapidly a dangerous situation may change and how officers must react in a split-second to a volatile situation, often where the officer fears for his or her life, or the lives of others. Further, the law fails to consider the realities of potential deadly encounters that an officer may have with a suspect and the

limits of the officer’s human performanc­e under stress.

When an officer is called on to use force, the circumstan­ces are chaotic, unpredicta­ble and influenced by numerous factors, such as body size, weather and lighting conditions, intoxicati­on of the subject, if weapons are displayed and so on. An officer’s neurologic­al and physical abilities are stressed to the limit in this scenario, and to expect detached reflection as to what someone else may later view as not necessary or not proportion­al is simply unrealisti­c, unfair and dangerous.

Under this law, a Maryland police officer could be charged criminally if he uses force in good faith and without malice to protect himself or others, if a judge or jury later decides that use of force was not necessary or proportion­al. This means that they will be evaluating the officer’s conduct in hindsight, in the calm atmosphere of a courtroom and not under the dangerous circumstan­ces actually faced by the officer. This standard places the officer in the untenable position of choosing either to refrain from using force and facing injury or death, or being sent to jail because the new law allows others to second-guess his critical decision-making — even if he makes a mere human mistake while doing a dangerous job.

This law will encourage suspects to resist arrest and, so, compel an officer to use force in the hopes that criminal charges against the suspect will be dropped and

imposed instead on the officer, as well as to seek damages in a lawsuit. These outcomes are harmful to community safety and taxpayer dollars.

This use of force statute is an affront to our police officers, will create dangerous conditions both for them and for the citizens they protect and is bad public policy.

These difficult statutes are slated to become effective on July 1, 2022. The General Assembly must act during its 2022 Session to correct these misguided laws.

 ?? ULYSSES MUÑOZ/BALTIMORE SUN ?? Police reform legislatio­n passed by the General Assembly, among other measures, sets limits on when police can use force against people and establishe­s a police disciplina­ry process with more civilian involvemen­t.
ULYSSES MUÑOZ/BALTIMORE SUN Police reform legislatio­n passed by the General Assembly, among other measures, sets limits on when police can use force against people and establishe­s a police disciplina­ry process with more civilian involvemen­t.

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