A storm in an aircraft carrier for the Royal Navy

The terrible treatment of Nick Cooke-priest is indicative of a service that is shirking big decisions

Irrespective of the rights or wrongs of any misdemeanours Commodore Nick Cooke-priest, hitherto the commander of Britain’s new 65,000-tonne Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, may or may not have committed, his treatment at the hands of his Royal Navy superiors is nothing less than a monumental public relations disaster.

At a time when our Senior Service is struggling to cope with a number of major challenges, from chronic undermanning to severe budgetary constraints, one would have thought that the top brass would have far more pressing issues to occupy their time than subjecting one of their most distinguished officers to public humiliation.

But no. Rather than devoting their energy to recruiting sufficient numbers of sailors to operate the small number of warships they still have at their disposal, they have instead decided to throw the book at Cdre

Cooke-priest on the most spurious of pretexts. The Royal Navy’s official line is that he has been “reassigned” – navy speak for being stripped of his command – over allegations that he “misused” the ship’s official car. They reached this conclusion after investigating a more serious charge that the officer had used the vehicle to take his family on holiday, an accusation that was subsequently found to be false.

Nevertheless, the Navy, in its wisdom, has concluded that the offence of misusing an official car in any capacity is so heinous that it merits relieving Cdre Cooke-priest of command of its £3billion flagship, though not before ordering him to sail the vessel from Rosyth, where she had been undergoing a dry-dock inspection, to her home port of Portsmouth.

Of course, the nation expects its senior military officers to meet the highest standards of honesty and integrity in their personal conduct, not least because it is vital that they set an example for other ranks.

But does improper use of an official car – a charge, incidentally, Cdre Cooke-priest insists is all the result of a misunderstanding – really deserve the kind of public dressing down he has received from his naval superiors?

There are certainly many other senior military officers who question the Navy’s handling of this sorry affair, not least General Sir Nick Carter, the Armed Forces’ chief who, I’m told, only heard about the Navy’s decision to sanction the commander of Britain’s pre-eminent warship after the event.

The Royal Navy no doubt believes how it conducts disciplinary procedures is an internal matter, one that does not merit wider discussion or explanation.

Yet, as can be seen from the very public outcry Cdre Cooke-priest’s treatment has prompted from a number of former senior military personnel, such as former First Sea Lord Admiral Lord West, senior officers appear to have misjudged the profound reputational damage the affair has caused.

First and foremost, it sends entirely the wrong signal to potential recruits. Anyone considering a career in the Navy is likely to have second thoughts when they see a distinguished officer of Cdre Cooke-priest’s pedigree being traduced over such a seemingly petty offence.

Senior sea lords also need to consider the impact their high-handed conduct is likely to have on our allies, not least in the US where the new carrier has received a great deal of practical support.

The other aspect of this sorry affair is that it gives the impression the Navy is more concerned with minutiae than looking at the bigger picture, such as how to ensure that it has sufficient numbers of combat surface ships available to fulfil its numerous overseas commitments, from antidrug smuggling operations in the Caribbean to supporting combined Nato operations in the North Sea. The Navy regularly complains that it is struggling to meet its commitments, and yet, when it comes to resolving the problem, it is less forthcoming.

The Government’s solution, as outlined in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, is to develop and build a more cost-effective class of vessel – the Type 31 – that did not have the hi-tech specifications of the Navy’s fleet of Type 26 frigates. The idea is that these cheaper, more versatile ships would be better suited to everyday naval policing operations, such as interdicting smugglers and combating piracy on the high seas, which do not require the deployment of a state-of-the-art warship as currently happens.

The appeal of this new design, from the government’s perspective, is that it would allow the Navy to increase the numbers of ships at its disposal while boosting export opportunities. But four years after the idea was first proposed, the Navy has still been unable to agree on a design for the new ship, prompting suspicions in Whitehall that it has no real interest in developing a cheaper alternative.

So long as Navy chiefs remain incapable of developing a new generation of warships to meet future challenges, the perception will remain that it is more fixated with minor issues than the defence of the realm.