Cabinet bypassed on 11 key Iraq decisions
Blair’s ‘sofa’ government left him free to plot war
TONY Blair repeatedly sidelined his Cabinet colleagues as he exploited ‘group-think’ to railroad through the Iraq invasion, Sir John Chilcot found.
In an attack on Mr Blair’s style of ‘sofa’ government, his report reveals that on at least 11 occasions, decisions were taken without any reference to the most senior figures in his own Cabinet.
It meant that the Prime Minister did not face ‘frank and informed debate and challenge’ over his actions.
The phrase ‘no substantive discussions’ appears frequently throughout Sir John’s report when he refers to major milestones in the run-up to war.
Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary from 2002 to 2005, described Mr Blair’s characteristic way of working with his Cabinet as: ‘I like to move fast. I don’t want to spend a lot of time in kind of conflict resolution, and, therefore, I will get the people who will make this thing move quickly and efficiently.’
Chancellor Gordon Brown, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and Leader of the House Robin Cook were excluded from decisionmaking, and the full Cabinet only discussed military options on ‘limited’ occasions.
Instead, Mr Blair took decisions alone or with his foreign secretary, Jack Straw. Sir John’s report concluded that, had Cabinet colleagues been consulted: ‘The process might have identified some of the wider implications and risks associated with the deployment of military forces to Iraq.’
It found that neither Mr Straw nor the then defence secretary Geoff Hoon were consulted on the infamous letter sent to President George W Bush in which Mr Blair wrote: ‘I will be with you, whatever.’
Sir John said: ‘The inquiry considers that where policy options include significant military deployments… the options should be considered by a group of ministers meeting regularly, so that Cabinet as a whole can be enabled to take informed collective decisions.’
He continued: ‘This can provide some external challenge from experienced members of the Government and mitigate any tendency towards group-think,’ he said.
‘In the case of Iraq, for example, the inclusion of the Chancellor or Deputy Prime Minister, as senior members of the Cabinet, or of Mr Cook, as a former foreign secretary known to have concerns about the policy, could have provided an element of challenge.’ Collective ministerial discussion would have encouraged ‘frank and informed debate and challenge’, adding: ‘Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.
‘And, when decisions have been made, they need to be implemented fully. Sadly, neither was the case in relation to the UK government’s actions in Iraq.’ The report lists 11 times when ministers were not properly involved in decision-making before the Iraq War.
It began with the December 2001 decision to offer to work with Mr Bush on a strategy to deal with Iraq as part the War on Terror, despite the lack of evidence of Iraqi involvement with the September 11 attacks or of links to Al Qaeda.
There was no possible discussion in February 2002 of Mr Blair’s decision that the way to remove Saddam Hussein was to invade Iraq; and two months later neither Mr Straw nor Mr Hoon were invited to a key meeting at Chequers.
Another decision point was the position Mr Blair should adopt in his discussion with Mr Bush at Camp David in September 2002.
Sir John concluded: ‘Mr Blair’s long note of 28 July, telling President Bush “I will be with you, whatever”, was seen, before it was sent, only by No10 officials.
‘A copy was sent afterwards to Mr Straw, but not to Mr Hoon ... it represented an extensive statement of the UK government’s position by the Prime Minister to the President. The foreign and defence secretaries should certainly have been given an opportunity to comment on the draft in advance.’
Sir John said there should also have been more discussion on the October 2002 decision to offer ground forces to the US for planning purposes, and the January 2003 decision to deploy large scale ground forces for operations in southern Iraq.
In addition, there was little discussion over a review of policy at the end of February 2003 when UN inspectors had found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction.
Sir John said the full Cabinet also did not discuss military options enough. Mr Hoon told the inquiry: ‘I do not recall a single Cabinet level discussion of specific troop deployments and the nature of their operations.’
‘Frank debate and challenge’