No easy change for local government
Perhaps the biggest public frustration is that nothing is being done to change local government. This perception is not true; there is action by provincial and national government, as well as by local communities. The problem is that much of this action is failing, or in the case of communities misdirected.
The go-to tool for the government to intervene in the worst-performing municipalities has been for a provincial government to place a municipality under section 139 administration and appoint an administrator. This has had mixed results, and though it can bring about positive change, for the most part it does not. Municipal IQ’s monitor of section 139 interventions shows 31 municipalities are under administration, and that most of these have been repeatedly for many years. Some, like Umzinyathi and Ngaka Modiri, have been under administration in some form or another for more than a decade.
Have these interventions simply become band-aids, repeatedly reapplied to little effect? An effective overhaul of floundering municipalities is undermined where provincial role players choose allegiance to powerful local or regional forces over serving the interests of the local community, even if intervention is pursued. It is critical to the success of local government that provincial government carries out its oversight role to effect change in those municipalities that are failing, most importantly (but not only) in section 139 administration. Provinces must follow through their oversight to hold councillors and connected senior administrators responsible for such failures and have them removed.
Why, in those municipalities showing the most outrageous displays of incompetence, failure and corruption, do we not see more change at the ballot box? In smaller (B2 and B3) and more rural (B4) municipalities, voting trends are deeply entrenched. The ANC in particular remains a dominant majority party in most regions. Those advocating an “Anyone but the ANC” vote still underestimate, in their attitude and offering, South Africans’ loyalty to the liberation party, particularly in these areas.
Service delivery protests have limited impact on electoral outcomes. Typically the same party against which protests are staged tends to be endorsed in elections, suggesting that protests are a form of engagement (often by those without a vote, such as the youth), or a specific grievance escalation rather than rejection.
Protest activity tends to target an individual councillor in a particular ward or locality, and is either not indicative of sentiment towards the dominant political party or reflective of the majority of voters in the municipality. Some cases protests mirror factional battles within a political party. Even in municipalities such as Makana, united, widespread community action against a poorly performing local council may not translate into an alternative list of candidates under a single banner.
The clamour for change through community action, protests and bad press is difficult to ignore, though, and there are signs that change comes when an active citizenry pressurises other spheres of government to hold local councils accountable and get rid of the worst councillors and officials.
On-the-ground performance of both councillors and administrators is governed by an armoury of local government law (in particular on structures, systems act and municipal finance management). Regulation flowing from this defines codes of conduct and management contracts as well as timelines for councillors and officials to constitute councils and submit budget and planning documents. If councillors and administrators were held accountable for their performance in terms of these rules, not only would many of them quickly be forced to leave, but delivery would be transformed. But there is almost no enforcement. The National Treasury has possibly had the greatest leverage in using the Municipal Finance Management Act to regulate municipal budgets and finances, and in particular withholding grant funding in serious instances of financial failure. But it often still has no choice but to dispense the equitable share grant (intended for free basic services for the poorest residents), even when this has been used to pay for inflated salaries or vehicles. Municipalities are brazenly aware they are constitutionally entitled to their share of national revenue, specifically this grant, and cannot be dictated to on how it is spent.
In perhaps the most promising sign of positive change, the auditor-general has made clear in her latest report on the sector that she will use her office to tighten up further where there is poor financial management and use the teeth granted to her in the 2019 Public Audit Act to pursue and hold accountable those municipal managers responsible for material irregularities identified in the latest audit reports.
For the rest, most sectoral provincial and national departments show little appetite for such confrontation to enforce good behaviour. We know from Municipal IQ’s compliance and governance index that there are almost no consequences for those municipalities that either don’t submit or submit their respective annual budgets and plans late. Deadlines aside, these documents should frame and direct the work of municipalities, but many contain unrealistic budgets and pie-in-the-sky plans that will never see the light of day.
Poor budgeting and planning indicate lack of competence in responsible departments within a municipality. Though the contracts of responsible managers detail their obligations regarding this work, these are rarely enforced. Unrealistic budgeting and planning in the worst municipalities mean the work that does happen is for the most part sporadic and crisis-driven.
Basic enforcement of budgeting and planning outcomes at higher levels would shake things up in municipalities and force mayors, municipal managers and CFOs to hold their subordinates and respective line department heads to account, as well as enforce more skilled appointments.
It is being argued that the experiment of one of the most devolved local government systems in the world was naive and has failed, and that oversight and support by other spheres through legislation and regulation have not translated into performance on the ground. Other spheres of government are themselves often compromised by capacity, especially where municipal dysfunction clusters, for instance in the North West. If this view is accepted, it follows that the constitution needs to be amended, with local government returning to a subservient tier controlled directly by provincial and national government. This would guard against the worst excesses, removing local political fiefdoms.
The disastrous state of the worst municipalities, the breakdown of their organisational institutions and systems, their inability to carry out critical functions such as revenue collection much less deliver services, not to mention their often ballooning billionrand bulk service debts, mean effecting change will be neither quick nor easy. But change must come and leaders in all spheres must take responsibility for it. Alternatively, continued failure in the sector will eventually force those remaining idealists to step aside, their faith in the sector proven to have been misplaced.
WORK THAT HAPPENS IS FOR THE MOST PART SPORADIC AND CRISIS-DRIVEN