Moving beyond rhetoric

The recently concluded Quad leaders' summit among the US, India, Australia and Japan prioritized several key takeaways. At the same time, it has also led to debates about the exact nature of the partnership. There has been commentary on whether it is a NATO-like security alliance framework, such as evolved during the Cold War. There have, of course, been arguments against such a characterization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

From India's point of view, given that it is currently engaged in a border standoff with China, there is considerable rhetoric in favor of prioritizing the military partnership among Quad countries and possibly developing it into a formal alliance framework. While there could be an argument that India would benefit from such an alliance, New Delhi has already made it clear that it does not view the Quad as a military alliance.

First, a military alliance implies that an attack on one will be deemed an attack on the other members of the alliance. However, concerns about entrapment and abandonment will always define the response of nation-states in an alliance framework. The messy withdrawal of the US and its allies from Afghanistan and the recent discussions on whether Washington will deploy boots on the ground if China invades Taiwan suggest that there will always be uncertainty as to whether allies will respond along anticipated lines.

Second, assistance from Quad countries to respond to situations such as China's aggression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) might be helpful. However, the prospect of any of the Quad members sending their troops to fight the Chinese People's Liberation Army on India's continental landmass is minimal.

Third, with the second-largest army in the world in terms of personnel, India does not require boots on the ground from other countries. Instead, it needs rapid technological upgradation of its defense capabilities. Given Japan's pacifist inclinations, its military partnership with India would be constrained, while Australia is a recipient of defense technologies rather than a major exporter of them.

Fourth, the Quad countries have varied strengths. Japan has enough capabilities to stand up to Chinese assertions in East Asia, whereas Australia will emerge stronger through the AUKUS (Australia-United StatesUnited Kingdom) security trilateral.

India has continued to demonstrate the ability to stand up to Chinese military aggression and has responded to Beijing's military buildups across the LAC with equal reinforcements. Last year, 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were killed in Ladakh skirmishes, and a border standoff has ensued since then.

Among the Quad members, only the US has a sufficient arsenal to stand up to China on its own across all theaters of the Indo-Pacific region. Hence it is not surprising that New Delhi has developed a robust security partnership with Washington. India enjoys a unique status as a major defense partner of the US and has license-free access to a wide range of military and dual-use technologies.

Moreover, Washington and Delhi have signed BECA, LEMOA and COMCASA, signaling long-term military cooperation. India's defense partnerships with Japan and Australia have also witnessed significant improvements in the recent past. India and Japan have signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), while India and Australia have signed a deal for reciprocal access to military bases for logistics support.

There is further scope and desire for an elevation of defense ties, as New Delhi has institutionalized separate 2+2 annual foreign- and defense-ministerial-level dialogues with Washington, Tokyo and Canberra.