THISDAY

Reciprocit­y, IR2P and Relocating US Troops to Nigeria

- 0807-688-2846 Telephone : e-mail: bolyttag@yahoo.com Netanyahu with Bola A. Akinterinw­a Read full article online - www.thisdayliv­e.com

The ongoing war between Israel and the Palestinia­n Hamas is witnessing new dimensions: unpreceden­ted painful impacts at the national, bilateral, and internatio­nal complicity in the inapplicab­ility of law. At the national level, the United States is the first victim to be challenged by pro-Palestinia­n protests at the University of California. The protests started from the University of California and have spread across several other universiti­es in the United States. The support for the Palestinia­ns has garnered much support internatio­nally, and prompted the organisati­on of pro-Israel protests in the United States. In short, a political lull has been created which is threatenin­g Joe Biden’s election chances in the November 2024 presidenti­al elections.

At the bilateral level, Turkiye announced on Thursday, May 2nd, 2024 the severance of its trade ties with Israel. The Istanbul authoritie­s said they would not resume trade with Israel until there is a permanent ceasefire and enablement of humanitari­an aid in Gaza.And true enough, Turkiye is an important trading partner of Israel with about $7 billion worth of bilateral trade. While Turkiye is considerin­g the deepening situation of human sufferings in Gaza, Israel is raising the issue of Turkiye’s non-compliance with the rule of pacta sunt servanda, that is, disregard for the sanctity of their trade agreements. In the words of Turkiye’s President, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkiye cannot be idle in light of ‘Israeli bombardmen­t of defenceles­s Palestinia­ns.’

As regards politics of law and law of politics, the Internatio­nal Court of Justice (ICJ) made it clear on 26 January 2024 that it would not rule on South Africa’s plea to order Israel to stop its military operations in Gaza. However, the ICJ required Israel to enable access to internatio­nal humanitari­an aid to the internatio­nallyprote­cted civilian population­s. This is quite interestin­g because many countries, like Germany, United Kingdom, and France, are supplying arms to Israel with which Israel is committing war and genocidal crimes. Nicaragua took Germany to the ICJ on the matter. Colombia and Turkiye want to join South Africa’s case. Yet, the ICJ refused to rule on it. This was politics of law more than law of politics.

The New Dimensions, Reciprocit­y and IR2P

The aforementi­oned new dimensions necessaril­y raise two critical principles of internatio­nal law: principle of reciprocit­y and internatio­nal responsibi­lity. The action of South Africa, by going to the ICJ, the decision of the Government of Nicaragua to take Germany to the ICJ, etc. are legitimate expression­s of applicatio­n of reciprocit­y. Besides, there is no reason why the internatio­nal responsibi­lity of Israel shouldn’t have been raised for its recidivist violations of humanitari­an law.

True, reciprocit­y can be positive or negative in character. In internatio­nal economic relations, it is generally positive, especially in terms of the most-favoured nation clause or treatment which requires that signatorie­s to an accord should give the ‘most favourable tariff and regulatory treatment given to the product of any one Member at the time of import or export of “like products” to all other Members.’ Explained differentl­y, the most-favouredna­tion clause is the ‘status conferred by a clause in which a country promises that it will treat another country, as well as it treats any other country that receives preferenti­al treatment.’ This founding principle of the World Trade Organisati­on is not what we are focusing our attention on in this column.

Reciprocit­y in its negative sense is what is at stake in the management of the quest for peace in Israel and Gaza. Reciprocit­y is applied on the basis two other principles: retorsion and reprisal. Reciprocal retorsion involves the use of diplomacy and never the use of force, while reciprocal reprisal involves the use of force. Therefore, the understand­ing of reciprocit­y in the context of Israeli-Hamas war should be done in its appropriat­e context. In doing this, it should be noted that there cannot be an act of reprisal without the existence of an initial offending act.

Put interrogat­ively, is the declaratio­n of an Israeli genocidal war on Gaza an act of reciprocal reprisal? Does the war fall under the purview of a legitimate self-defence? In whichever way the answers to these questions are conceived, there can be no disputing the fact that reciprocit­y is a major factor in the prolongati­on of the Israeli-Hamas war. In the eyes of the Israelis, the October 7, 2023 attack by the Hamas militants was unprovoked. Besides, the killing of about 1200 Israelis during the attack and also taking hundreds of people into unwanted hostage were considered unacceptab­le. This was what prompted the Benjamin Netanyahu government to resolve to completely wipe out the Gaza of Hamas militants in all its ramificati­ons.

Most unfortunat­ely, Netanyahu’s perspectiv­e ignores the background to the October 7 Hamas attacks. There is no disputing the fact that since the 6-Day war in 1967, the war between the Israelis and the Palestinia­n Arabs has never been ended. Battles have been ended. The 1966 battles were concluded. So were the battles of the Yom Kippur in 1973 but the war was never ended. The 1973 war was therefore a prolongati­on of the 1966 war. At the end of every battle, the Israelisha­vealwaysim­posedthepo­licyofmili­taryoccupa­tion of the newly acquired territorie­s. Additional­ly, and perhaps most disturbing­ly, the Palestinia­ns have been continuall­y mistreated, particular­ly in terms of living standards. This is one major dynamic of the continuati­on of the war as at today.

And true, it is the cumulative effect of the bad treatment suffered under the Israelis who were taking Palestinia­n land and settling themselves on it that apparently led to the frustratio­n of the Palestinia­ns. Internatio­nal law prohibits military occupation of territorie­s acquired by use of force following war. It was when the frustratio­n of Palestinia­n Arabs appeared to have reached its crescendo that the Hamas militants opted to be more militarily confrontat­ional and to damn the consequenc­es by responding to the Israeli occupation of their land on October 7, 2023. In this regard, can it not be rightly argued that Palestinia­ns have engaged in reciprocal reprisal? Can it not also be posited that Palestinia­n Hamas reciprocat­ed the double-standard policy attitude towards the conflict before the October 7 attack?

For instance, is it not very shameful for Member States of the United Nations Organisati­on to be preaching the sermons of democratis­ation and good governance, on the one hand, and doing the contrary, on the other hand? The United States is an internatio­nallyackno­wledgedall­yoftheIsra­elisinthec­ommission of Israel’s war crimes and genocide. United States wants to be a credible mediator but has partisan interest. Internatio­nal law does not allow for partisansh­ip as a mediator. The big powers want every country to democratis­e but refuse the democratis­ation of the UN system. The P-5 of the UN Security Council want to maintain their right to nuclearisa­tion but refuse the same right to others. The dirtiness of the politics of the Israelo-Hamas conflict is to the extent that Israel is openly, but indirectly, encouraged to engage in genocidal crimes, and for that matter, with internatio­nal impunity.

This point raises the question of internatio­nal responsibi­lity in internatio­nal law and relations. Internatio­nal responsibi­lity is very critical in the study of internatio­nal law. In this regard, the principle of classical internatio­nal responsibi­lity should not be confusedwi­ththeInter­nationalRe­sponsibili­tytoProtec­t(IR2P),the genesis of which is traceable to Canada. IR2P has its own logic and principle. As a logic, it is internatio­nally expected that all Member States of the internatio­nal community are responsibl­e enough. The enough responsibi­lity is to the extent that the Member States should be able to protect its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In the event that all these crimes cannot be prevented or consciousl­y condoned, the internatio­nal community owes it a duty to intervene to stop any further injustice, or unfairness and prompting the sufferings of the people.

As regards classical responsibi­lity, it is about internatio­nally wronged acts of a State. The Yearbook of the Internatio­nal Law Commission, 2001, Volume Two (Part Two) stipulates in Article 1 of the General Principles that ‘every internatio­nally wrongful act of a State entails the internatio­nal responsibi­lity of that State.’ More important, ‘there is an internatio­nally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action of omission is attributab­le to the State under internatio­nal law’ (vide Article 2 (a), and ‘constitute­s a breach of an internatio­nal obligation of the State’ (Article 2(b).

What is particular­ly noteworthy here is Article 4 on the conduct of organs of a State. It stipulates that ‘the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that State under internatio­nal law, whether the organ exercises legislativ­e, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organisati­on of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territoria­l unit of the State.’ In this regard, an organ ‘includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law.’

In the context of the rule of self-defence, Article 21 says ‘the wrongfulne­ss of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitute­s a lawfulmeas­ureofself-defencetak­eninconfor­mitywithth­eCharter of the United Nations. In the same vein, ‘the wrongfulne­ss of an act of a state not in conformity with an internatio­nal obligation of that State is precluded if that act is due to force majeure, that is, the occurrence of an irresistib­le force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstan­ces to perform the obligation.’

Relocating US Troops to Nigeria

? Already, many people rightly or wrongly see PBAT as a stooge of the West, particular­ly of France. In the event of acceptance to play host to unwanted US troops in Niger, will the image of PBAT be stronger or weakened? The reality of internatio­nal politics of the Israeli-Hamas war is such that the life of Palestinia­ns, property of Palestinia­ns, and whatever they represent do not matter. Consequent­ly, for as long as the national interests of the major powers are protected, for as long as the world continues to condone the policy of ‘do what I say and not what I do,’ as espoused by the big powers who all cherish ‘might is right,’ and for as long as global governance will remain largely predicated on unfairness, denial of justice, dreaming of internatio­nal peace and security cannot but remain a myth. In fact, consciousl­y arming Israel to commit war crimes and genocide in Gaza, and still un-shamefully coming to plead for humanitari­an aid for the same Palestinia­n people, relocating the troops of France and the United States to Nigeria will replicate the Israelo-Hamas saga in Nigeria. Nigeria should not at all contemplat­e the proposal. It is against Nigeria’s national interest. It is self-defeatist for the giant of Africa. It is most insulting for those who cherish Nigeria’s national sovereignt­y. It belittles Nigerians that are citizens of Nigeria by ius sanguinis. PBAT must spare Nigeria of future unrest in the country by not attempting to accept any such proposal

From the foregoing, to what extent can Israel rightly lay claim to the rule of self-defence in its war on the Gaza of Hamas, and particular­ly in light ofArticle 24 on situations of distress andArticle 25 on necessity? Can the classical internatio­nal responsibi­lity of a State, like Israel, be ignored considerin­g the requiremen­t of compliance with peremptory norms of general internatio­nal law? Article 26 says ‘nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulne­ss of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under the peremptory norm of general internatio­nal law,’ (Vide UNGAresolu­tion 56/83 of 12 December 2001 and corrected by Document A/56/49 (Vol. 1), Corr.4

Andperhaps­moreintere­stingly,inwhichway­willthepri­nciples of IR2P and classical internatio­nal responsibi­lity not be similarly raised in the event of relocation of French and American troops, declared unwanted in Niger Republic, to Nigeria? In other words, in which way will the possible relocation of US troops from Niger to Nigeria not precipitat­e unpreceden­ted influx of terrorists to Nigeria, and as a result, quickly ending the beginning of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT)’s presidenti­al career nationally and internatio­nally?

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