This time next week

This time next week, the nation will be dealing with one out of a number of major possible developments. One is an election outcome with a clear winner and a loser who has accepted the outcome. At this stage of the contest, the winner could be President Buhari or Vice President Atiku Abubakar. There must be those who put some value on polls on Nigerian elections. I would, too, but my native intelligence and the bewildering array of signals, huge (largely paid, non-voting) crowds at rallies, endorsements and counter-endorsements, accusations and alarms over plans to rig the elections, the rising profile of violence and the usual last-minute flood of resources aimed at indifferent, hostile and stubborn constituencies suggest that this election will be too close to call. This is the best possible outcome, but not necessarily the most probable.

The second possible outcome is an inconclusive election. The best variant of this will be a run-off, a repeat election following the failure of any candidate to score twenty five percent of valid votes in at least twenty four States of the federation and a majority of valid votes. In this event the two candidates with the highest votes will slug it out for a simple majority. On the basis of current appearances alone, both Buhari and Atiku will meet the spread requirement. A repeat election is therefore possible, but most unlikely. Another variant of this outcome is the possible existence of large parts of the country where voting and collation processes could not be concluded owing to failures of key elements of election processes to be put in place , or violent disruptions of the processes.

The scale of these failures must be such that they will affect the results if they are discounted. The most probable causes of disruptions on a scale that will make elections inconclusive days after voting are widespread violence and massive failures of say, the card reader and absence of election officials or ballot papers and result sheets for prolonged periods. INEC has no control over police and other security agencies, although these will play vital roles in the management of the electoral process. They can be compromised to a point where they damage the credibility of the process, and their disposition and commitment could even determine the degree to which violence becomes a major factor in influencing decisions whether results are acceptable or not. It is possible therefore that result of the presidential elections may not be conclusive, owing to process or security failures, but there are enough cushions in the process to make even a damaged election conclusive. The devil is in the danger of prolonged delays and the tensions they will generate. Nigerian elections have never passed the E- grade. The most distinguishing aspect of the 2015 elections was that the results were accepted by the loser. A lot more went into that decision of the loser than the conviction that he lost a credible election.

A third possible outcome is a disputed election result. This worse-case scenario has worse case scenarios. One is refusal of defeated candidate(s) to accept defeat and deciding to challenge it in court. Nigerian politicians hate this option, and they equate being told to go to court with being told to go to hell. Many will take their chances with going to hell than go to court, thanks to the history of judicial pronouncements on election litigations. But they did go to court, hundreds and thousands of times, making big lawyers and bent judges fortunes. Buhari and Atiku know this path better than most politicians, so they will be in familiar territory if they lose and are told by the opposition and the global community to go to hell (sorry, court).

The worst-case variant of a disputed election is one in which the defeated candidate with a strong following repudiates the results on the grounds that it is massively rigged, calls on his supporters to do same, refuses to recognize the government it will bring about and is supported in his cause by large sections of domestic and international opinion. Africa and the world are replete with these cases. President Jonathan’s recent autobiography suggests that some of his advisers had canvassed this option when it became obvious that Jega’s INEC was going to declare Buhari winner. A blitz of warnings and counsel from external sources and a few brave local mediators (and, according to him, his deep personal concern over the consequences of this line of action) made him reject that option and place that historic call to Buhari to concede defeat.

This time next week, we may know whether INEC’s insistence that it is committed to the conduct of credible elections has been vindicated by the facts. A narrow margin will severely test the credibility and acceptability of the elections, but it looks like the most probable outcome. A clear margin of, say, three million votes is possible, but improbable. Jonathan accepted defeat (and apparently assurances of a life with immunity) with a lower margin. What palliatives could be dangled before a loser to get him to walk away from causing trouble even if he is on his way to court? Would all the administration’s juggling of police top brass have paid off with clear disadvantages for the opposition, or will it all pass as staple politician wolf-crying? Would elRufai’s scare tactics against international observers intimidate an otherwise robust plan to observe and report on the elections, or will observers( who include a large dose of Africans) deepen relations with local CSOs and ensure that their presence is felt?

This time next we will be assessing the impact of violence in our electoral process. A violent-free post-election scenario is possible, but improbable. If Buhari loses, some of his supporters will light up fires even if he does not tell them to. If he wins, some of those who voted for his opposition, particularly in areas with endemic ethno-religious conflicts, may vent their anger on his supporters. The postelection violence in 2011 will remain a deep scar on the growth of our democratic traditions. It served the useful purpose of spurring prominent Nigerians, other Africans and the world to work towards avoiding a repeat or worse in 2015.The probability that the world would play the same role in these elections is not high and comforting, but it is possible that it can make some difference between large-scale violence and a peaceful transition.

This time next week, we may see glimpses of the deepening of our democratic processes with credible elections and peaceful transitions, or its retrogression with disputed results and widespread violence. The signs that politicians are united in raising the bar set in 2015 are not encouraging, although they sign bits of paper and tell the world that they support free and fair elections. What is both possible and desirable is that more Nigerians will turn out than they did in 2015 to decide the type of nation they will like to live in for the next four years.

Jamila Abubakar wrote this piece from Abuja