Power struggles in Tehran
The battle for the presidency of the Islamic Republic
Over the past 45 years, the Islamic Republic has committed numerous crimes. It might be wise to establish a museum similar to a Holocaust museum, named the “Museum of Mullahs’ Crimes,” in various locations worldwide after the regime’s collapse. This would help future generations understand what has transpired in Iran and the Middle East. Ebrahim Raisi, a notorious criminal figure, met justice accidentally, much like Qasem Soleimani. Both were killed harshly, and their deaths may have been a response to their roles in massacring innocent people. Raisi’s sudden death or removal from the power scene was unexpected and its full implications and dimensions remain unclear.
Raisi, known as the “butcher of Tehran,” was superficially respected by entities such as the European Union, the US government, the United Nations, Hamas, the Barzani tribe, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sistani in Iraq. This was met with ridicule and serious criticism from the Iranian people, who saw it as a trivial display of artificial respect. Imposed by the Islamic Caliphate system of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, Raisi was inappropriately labeled an Ayatollah and a doctor, and declared a martyr upon his death, despite never winning a free election. It was a dirty plan of the regime’s propaganda machine. In truth, Raisi was devoid of personality, educational background, knowledge, or a distinct political stance. He was merely a compliant figure, trusted by Khamenei but mocked by the Iranian populace.
It’s notable that Raisi, the vice president of the Assembly of Experts – whose sole purpose is to appoint leadership – was removed or eliminated 48 hours before a critical meeting, which might have elevated him to the presidency of the Assembly. Tragically, Raisi died and burned to ashes in the worst horrific manner on May 19, 2024. Khamenei has thus lost one of his chief executioners or the signatories of the killing machine and must now appoint a successor.
The upcoming days in Iran are fraught with tension as power-hungry factions jockey for proximity to the leadership. The next few weeks will reveal a true power struggle among the wolves, with the contenders openly attacking each other. However, in the Islamic Caliphate system, the competition for more power and the elimination of rivals are both a commonplace and well-known matter.
IN THE next 48 days, the internal societal atmosphere will be bleak and lifeless as the significant gap between the populace and the rulers becomes more pronounced. Although the candidates will quickly try to engage the disenchanted and estranged society by publicly undermining and defaming each other, this ridiculous show is all too familiar to the Iranian people. The gap between the rulers and the nation is serious.
On one side, the economic cartels within the regime, such as Astan Quds Razavi, the Mostazafan Foundation of Islamic Revolution (MFJ), the Executive Headquarters of Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), and the IRGC, are intent on preserving the status quo. Conversely, all terrorist groups involved in the 1978 riots are committed to the regime’s survival. Moreover, it is crucial to reiterate that both pro-regime reformists (Islamic Left) and conservatives (Hardliners) represent two sides of the same coin.
Khamenei chooses the president based on three criteria: obedience in executing orders without question, loyalty to the system and the Islamic Caliphate or regime of mullahs, and readiness to defend the regime by any means, including crime and suppression. Unfortunately, all candidates share common traits: they are uneducated, vile, compliant, criminal, thoughtless, incompetent, corrupt, and opportunistic.
Being president in the Islamic Caliphate system means being willing to suppress demonstrations and commit murder to maintain the regime’s security. These three traits ensure the continuation of a presidency that values loyalty over competence, efficiency, education, expertise, and merit. With this setup, elections are rendered meaningless. The opinions of the people are disregarded by the Islamic Republic system. Only the extent of trust in loyalty to the mafialike ruling establishment of the mullahs is important. So, the elections in Iran’s regime are worthless.
For the mafia regime, public participation is irrelevant. The mullah’s regime requires only the semblance of involvement for propaganda purposes. Notably, the response to the elections three years ago, where invalid votes frequently came in second, and in the last parliamentary elections, where they sometimes came in first, underscores this disconnection. Possibly, the upcoming elections may see a similar pattern. The Islamic Republic holds no genuine place in the hearts or minds of the Iranian people.
In the upcoming 48-day electoral period, figures such as Bagher Qalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Mohseni Ejei are can be mentioned. Others, like Ali Larijani, are less
favored. Meanwhile, Ali Shamkhani is known for his ties to theSaudi Arabian intelligence service, and Mohsen Rezaei, who failed to secure a visa to speak at a Washington Institute think tank about war, is seen unfavorably, even as his son made it to America. However, later he appeared as a worthless clown, and America avoided getting close to him.
ULTlMATELY, THE specific electoral candidates are irrelevant to the Iranian populace, who see all as indistinguishable and unimportant, particularly when appearing in the regime’s farcical electoral displays with invalid votes.
The ruling power structure always holds potential and foresight for significant shifts, but it is clear that under the new presidency, after Khamenei’s possible death, these dynamics will undergo major changes. The role of Russia in the succession process is also crucial, as
their acceptance of Mojtabi Khamenei shows no signs of concern. Russia’s presence remains a significant barrier to the success of democracy advocacy and the national movement for regime change in Iran. The regime in Tehran is messy and ineffective, solely focused on continuing the Islamic Caliphate of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and serving as a vassal state to Russia and China.
Interestingly, the timing of Iran’s elections, occurring 4 to 5 months before those in America, may not significantly impact US policy. However, currently, behind-the-scenes talks between the White House and the Islamic Republic are ongoing. Iran faces a severe security crisis, and any incident could disrupt the regime’s plans, with no assurances of stability. no one knows if the Islamic Republic will remain in power for the next 4 years. The ongoing competition for leadership, filled with conspiracies and
demonic plots akin to historical Islamic caliphates, shows the regime’s fragility.
With Raisi gone from the scene, the Islamic Republic in Iran is likely to continue its current course, showing little inclination for change. The regime is becoming more militarized and closedoff, increasing the likelihood of further internal and external conflicts. The security and military sectors are set to expand, pushing the government towards greater militarization and authoritarianism. The power centers within Iran are complex and layered, but the country remains vulnerable to any disruptive events, highlighting the lack of stability.