Should US stop wasting money on Pak?
Opinion is growing in the US questioning the country’s continued financial support of Pakistan when there’s little return.
“We have wasted an enormous amount of blood and treasure in Afghanistan. Their government has zero appreciation. Let’s get out”, tweeted Donald Trump in November 2013, noting that the United States had been at war in Afghanistan for the previous 12 years. Nearly four years later, now President Trump, surrounded by sober generals in the White House, the message has changed. “My original instinct was to pull out”, he said last week, “and historically I like following my instincts, but all of my life I heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office”. How true and reassuring! The most interesting aspect of this volte face, however, was Trump’s reference to Pakistan’s failure to deliver on promises to stop undermining stability in Afghanistan by continuing to support terrorist fighters by both financing them and providing them with sanctuary. As if to twist the knife, he praised India for its genuinely constructive role in Afghanistan.
Opinion is growing in the US questioning the country’s continued financial support of Pakistan when it appears to get so little in return. Although shrouded in secrecy until recently, it is reported that Pakistan has received some $78 billion (at 2016 value) between 1948 and 2016. A significant part of this, amounting to $ 18bn, was approved by Congress following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. There has been much debate, however, on whether this has been spent on military and economic aid, or whether a significant amount has been spent by Pakistan to cover its civilian deficit. Whichever the case, questions are being asked on the return the US has received for its generosity. As Trump said in his recent speech, “We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars, at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting.” So, should the US cut off all aid to Pakistan, or will this create further problems for its strategy in Afghanistan?
Most people understand the principle of “carrot and stick” or “inducement and punishment”. President Barack Obama tried the carrot approach following the election of a civilian government in Pakistan in 2008. The following year, the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act” offered $1.5bn in civilian aid each year for the following five years, with the possibility of a further five years. This inducement, with modest strings attached, was designed to help to strengthen democracy in the country with the hope of greater civilian control over the powerful military and intelligence services. However, with both permeating almost every aspect of life in Pakistan, this approach was doomed to almost certain failure. Throughout his presidency, Obama continuously failed to establish a regime of resultslinked aid and support with Pakistan, although in its dying months it did withhold $300m in military aid. The question is, can the new administration of Trump create these conditions or will it simply repeat the frustrations of the Obama era?
Early indications are promising with the announcement in March 2017 by the Pentagon of its refusal to pay $350m in military aid to Pakistan because it deemed the country to be not doing enough to tackle terrorism. This was the first concrete indication of the willingness of the Trump administration to take a tough stance towards Pakistan. A Pentagon spokesman said that “the funds cannot be released to the government of Pakistan because the Secretary of Defense could not certify that Pakistan had taken sufficient action against the Haqqani Network”, the group of militants based around the Pakistan/Afghanistan border which has been blamed for attacks on western and Afghan forces. This provoked a reaction from Pakistan when a foreign ministry spokesperson described the decision as “very short sighted. The US should realise that without Pakistan’s help, Afghanistan cannot be stabilised.” A further indication of the new policy was provided this week when the Trump administration notified Congress that some $255m of military assistance would be held back, conditional on Pakistan tackling the terrorist organisations said to be harboured in the country. However, herein lies the rub, as Shakespeare would say. How can you rely on a sovereign state to help you achieve your aims, at the same time punish it for not doing enough?
A clue to the solution of this conundrum is provided in a compelling publication earlier this year by the Washington-based Hudson Institute, entitled “A new US Approach to Pakistan: Enforcing Aid Conditions without Cutting Ties” written by Husain Haqqani (no connection to the terrorist) and Lisa Curtis. Haqqani was the 24th Pakistan ambassa- dor to the US, and is now an influential commentator of South Asian affairs living in Washington. In the publication the authors argue that the US should avoid viewing and portraying Pakistan as an ally, recognising that the country has engaged in supporting the Afghan Taliban, who have killed American troops and their allies in Afghanistan. At the same time, the option for Pakistan to be an ally of the US in the future should be maintained. If the support of terrorist groups is terminated, then substantial trade and investment would follow. Humanitarian and social aid should be continued with a prioritised engagement with civilian leaders. The US should work diplomatically with countries such as China and the Gulf states, which share concern about Pakistan’s tolerance of terrorist organisations and individuals in order to apply pressure on the country, perhaps behind the scenes to avoid embarrassment. The US should enforce counterterrorism conditions on its aid and reimbursements to Pakistan. The option of using unilateral action, including drones, to target Taliban targets in Pakistan should be kept. A time-line of specific actions, which Pakistan must take against terrorists, should be established, linked to future US military assistance. Finally, a list of calibrated actions should be presented to Pakistan, aimed at ending its support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, making clear that the failure to make substantial progress on the list could eventually result in Pakistan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The latter would preclude the US from providing any kind of aid to Pakistan and would lead to an irreparable breach in the relationship, a position some in Congress have already recommended. John Dobson worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s Office between 1995 and 1998 and is presently Chairman of the Plymouth University of the Third Age. The outcome of the Bawana Assembly byelection in North Delhi went virtually unnoticed in the cacophony of the Dera Sacha Sauda chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh’s arrest and subsequent violence both in Haryana and Punjab. However, the significance of the electoral verdict lies in the fact that those who had written off the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) following the results of the Assembly polls in Punjab and Goa, as well as the municipal corporation elections in Delhi, have been proved inaccurate.
The AAP scored a convincing victory over the BJP in the prestigious contest triggered by the resignation of the sitting AAP MLA, Ved Prakash, who quit his seat to join the BJP. In fact, the confrontation appeared to be a precursor of how politics could unfold in the national capital during the next round of polls—both Parliament and Assembly.
In other words, the byelection has further confirmed that the two main players in Delhi were going to be the AAP and the BJP. This is definitely bad news for the Congress, which performed reasonably well while trailing behind the saffron brigade primarily because its nominee, Surinder Kumar, a three-time MLA, put up a stiff fight. The Congress received votes due to its candidate and so had little to do with the party’s contribution. The Delhi Congress president, Ajay Maken attempted to analyse the polls in terms of percentages, while maintaining that the Congress vote share had increased. However, in politics it is the winner who stands on the podium and other permutations, semantics and explanations are simply just poor consolations.
The result has certainly brought the BJP back on the ground, forcing its leaders to re-think and reassess their strength. The massive municipal corporation triumph was primarily due to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity, which facilitated the party to sweep the Uttar Pradesh elections shortly prior to the civic polls. The party had won despite its dismal performance in the three municipal bodies, where it had been in power for a decade, and by all accounts, the win was purely linked to the Prime Minister and had next to nothing to do with the local netas.
The loss also had a sobering influence on AAP workers, who previously had been flying sky-high, pursuing ambitions of becoming an alternative to the BJP in many of the states where the Congress had been strong and was now conclusively, though gradually, losing to the BJP. Modi’s dream of making India Congress-free seemed to be becoming a reality till Captain Amarinder Singh, in March, halted the BJP juggernaut in Punjab.
The AAP volunteers and workers were down in the dumps, but one single victory in Delhi has absolutely resuscitated the party. It is a rejuvenated cadre that the BJP would have to contend with in the future, and it could happen before this year comes to an end, provided Arvind Kejriwal decides to throw the dice in Gujarat; with of course the assistance of the disgruntled Patel community, which in the past has always backed the BJP, but is at present peeved with the saffron leadership.
It is evident that post the municipal drubbing, Kejriwal appears to have realised that a continuous confrontationist approach was not going to help his cause. Therefore, the most appropriate course would be to maintain a low-profile, thereby consolidating his position, while discreetly introspecting with the rank and file. Kejriwal, thereby, has been focusing on strategy and future tactics, thus leaving day to day functioning to Manish Sisodia, his deputy, who, in fact, has acquitted himself decidedly well.
Visibly unable to have clearly comprehended the astute and insightful politician, which the Delhi Chief Minister has turned out to be, his detractors had prematurely drafted his political obituary. Some claimed that he had surrendered to the BJP and its leadership, resulting in a ceasefire between the two warring parties. As a matter of fact, the AAP stopped training its guns on the BJP leaders, who too, halted their attacks.
The temporary truce may end soon as the Gujarat elections draw closer, and Kejriwal, who is a subject of both contempt and ridicule in the Congress and the BJP, may on the political centre stage make a comeback with a bang. Obviously, he is chastened by the political developments from the time he emerged on the national scene and would therefore currently devise his plans with a more realistic approach. The methods would differ from place to place, and to remain relevant he would highlight issues that are of interest to the locals as well as dominating communities.
The supreme irony is that the BJP and AAP share a common objective—that of decimating the Congress. While the BJP is working on completely replacing the Congress as the primary party in all states, the AAP is concentrating on taking over its base, thereby rendering it totally ineffective. It has succeeded in doing so in Delhi and realises that it could take advantage of a weakened Congress and BJP in Gujarat as well. After Modi has come to the Centre, BJP’s dominance in his own state has been diminishing with his successors unable to emulate his governance mantra.
Bawana is a shot in the arm for Kejriwal and has once again made him politically apposite even if the victory was achieved in a single Assembly segment. It is the break he needed. Between us.