What next?

That’s what India’s voter is asking. Mission mode interventions, or charismatic leadership, will not cut it

THERE IS PALPABLE relief that politics has reverted to the mean of the last three decades. The Opposition is stronger, coalitions are back, the hubris of one leader has been checked, and normal politics seems to have re-emerged from under the shadow of Hindutva. As reflected in the CSDS post-poll survey, economic issues seemed to dominate, at least amongst those who voted against the BJP. How does one interpret this multi-layered outcome, beyond analyses of tactical choices?

One plausible interpretation of the election is that sooner or later every political party and leader, no matter how powerful, discovers that governing India, and bringing about a structural transformation of its economy, is difficult. Political parties have typically tried to craft electoral coalitions through two instruments. The first is government “schemes” — a range of worthy measures, from employment programmes, cash transfers, in kind transfers of goods from food to bicycles, and of late, infrastructure projects. In recent years, the capacity across all states to deliver them better has improved. But they all have one feature in common. They are thought of as schemes that can be implemented in mission mode. They create a oneshot intervention that is often necessary (think MGNREGA, free distribution of gain, building toilets, roads). And for about a couple of terms, they can bring a ruling political party some credit, if implemented well.

But from a political point of view, they suffer from two limitations. Once institutionalised, the voter asks: What next? At the end of their terms, most politicians are banking on the success of these schemes, whereas voters are already moving on. There were other issues, but arguably UPA 2 had drawn down all its credit for schemes like MGNREGA. In recent years, state governments that have been quite good at building welfare coalitions and cash transfers, including Odisha, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, have lost. Last year, Congress lost in Rajasthan even after an expansive welfare push. In this election, the BJP came across as a broken record on schemes it had already delivered, whereas the voter was looking for something fresh. So the very success of these schemes — if, for a moment, we grant that they have been suc

At India’s level of poverty, many of the schemes make economic sense. But the structural transformation of the Indian economy to produce good jobs is still slow. Parts of the economy, particularly the top 20 per cent, have done well, and poverty has been alleviated. But rural wages have not risen much, given costs of living in real terms, nor have urban wages. Agriculture is not a viable choice for most in rural India, but their paths out of it are uncertain. Gains have been nullified by skyrocketing inflation in areas that ought to be public goods like education. Addressing these issues requires routine forms of governance, negotiating with a large number of actors, and putting in small reforms simultaneously, many of which might not even bring you political credit.

cessful — can become a fetter for an incumbent. Depending on your point of view, you can say the Indian voter cannot be bribed beyond a point, or that she is too demanding.

The second political limitation is the economic effects of the scheme. At India’s level of poverty, many of these schemes make economic sense. But the structural transformation of the Indian economy to produce good jobs is still slow. Parts of the economy, particularly the top 20 per cent, have done well, and poverty has been alleviated. But rural wages have not risen much, given costs of living in real terms, nor have urban wages. Agriculture is not a viable choice for most in rural India, but their paths out of it are uncertain. Gains have been nullified by skyrocketing inflation in areas that ought to be public goods like education. Addressing these issues requires routine forms of governance, negotiating with a large number of actors, and putting in small reforms simultaneously, many of which might not even bring you political credit.

So it is easier to build toilets than create running sewage systems, buy a whole bunch of electric vehicles than doing all the things systematically required to clean the air, rely on MSP or cash transfers to alleviate agricultural distress rather than a transformation of the sector, even do an incentive linked PLI rather than transform routine governance to enable private investment to take off, distribute cash rather than create better jobs. More controversially, you could argue that Yogi Adityanath’s so-called law and order push, could use a one-shot mission mode of intervention to rein in the power of lots of small mafias and replace it with the power of the state. But the mission mode approach to law and order licensed its own impunity and did nothing to improve policing or justice systems. Sooner or later, the structural obduracy of Indian governance and the economy, will mug every political party. Structural transformation requires “the slow boring of hard boards”, to use Max Weber’s phrase. Mission mode interventions, or charismatic leadership, will not cut it.

But this also has implications for the second mobilisation instrument: Identity politics. Those also face the same challenge. Identity issues also have a mission mode manifestation. In the case of Mandal, it was reservation. In the case of Hindutva, a series of demands — Kashmir, building a temple at Ayodhya and so forth. But again, the same limitations apply. After you have achieved a set of mission mode goals, then what?

Mandal politics floundered not because it was repudiated. It floundered because its policy focal point had been achieved. Now it has to reinvent itself with another focal point, like extending reservation or caste census. It also floundered because the Mandal parties (SP, RJD), having come into power, could not bring about an enduring governance or economic transformation.

The rejection of the BJP is not a rejection of Hindutva: The building of the temple was popular and communalism is growing. But the BJP made the mistake of thinking this could transform into political capital indefinitely. Whereas voters were asking: What next? The consolidation of Hindutva as a political force in part depended on its ability to deliver a vision of developed India. It did, in some areas that could be dealt with in mission mode. But the fundamental transformations again eluded it. So both caste- and religion-based parties become more attractive if they can convince voters they can govern well.

Modi has discovered that is not as easy. The reason the RSS is distancing itself from Modi somewhat is that it does not want the taint of Modi’s governance failures to taint the ideology, just as the governance failures of SP or RJD tainted Mandal politics for a while. All it tells us is that parties will have to up the ante to answer the question: What next?

For the INDIA alliance, it is Mandal politics in a new mission mode. For the BJP, it will be the quest for the next polarising issue. Both will search for a new mission mode welfare intervention, though the BJP has a disadvantage since it is the incumbent. But whether either will be able to move the needle on the structural transformation of India is an open question. The peculiar dignity, and tragedy, of politics is that we are all asking questions no political party can confidently answer.