The U.S.-Saudi agreement, from
Over eight decades of eventful ties between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have had their ups and downs — from the oil embargo of 1973 to the Jamal Khashoggi assassination in 2018. However, two images of this relationship remain iconic: the rst is of the meeting between the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud on Valentine’s Day 1945 aboard a U.S. cruiser beginning seven decades of an unbroken bilateral bromance. It was underpinned by an understated but seminal “oil-for-security” symbiosis. The second iconic frame is the st-bump of July 15, 2022 in Riyadh between U.S. President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), symbolising a more equal and largely transactional partnership.
If the buzz around is to be believed, Riyadh and Washington are on the verge of a new and enhanced relationship, tentatively titled Strategic Alliance Agreement (SAA). This ‘Grand Bargain” between them being negotiated for the past year is designed to match the domestic and regional ambitions of Al-Saud under MbS with the keenness of the White House to score a diplomatic success big enough to ensure Mr. Biden’s re-election.
The layers to the agreement
Reading between the lines of the U.S. media’s episodic coverage, the SAA could have three interlinked components: bilateral, regional and global. At a bilateral level, it would codify the current implicit bilateral alliance into a strategic defence pact modelled on the U.S.-Japan treaty committing the Pentagon to come to the Kingdom’s rescue in case of an attack. The U.S. would also equip Riyadh with means to defend itself which would include the state-of-art F-35 stealth ghters. More surprisingly, Washington, a non-proliferation hawk, seems to be agreeable to providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology for peaceful use. At a regional level, Riyadh wants a ceasere in Gaza and some movement towards a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine problem. As a quid pro quo for Riyadh’s maximalist demands, Washington reportedly has put forth a daunting wish list of its own. It wants Riyadh to recognise Israel and have full normal diplomatic relations. It also wants the Kingdom to ring-fence its foreign policy to avoid getting too close to Washington’s rivals, specically, Beijing and Moscow.
While the precise economic underpinnings of the incipient SAA are not known, they are likely to be quite substantive. Although the U.S. is no longer dependent on Saudi oil supplies, the two sides are unlikely to abandon their long-standing coordination to balance the global market between the U.S. need for cheaper energy with a Saudi quest for higher oil revenue. The SAA is a former Indian Ambassador
The proposed Strategic Alliance Agreement may have been forced by Washington’s fear of losing Riyadh