Biden’s foreign policy lacks strategic clarity
The US is stuck in the Cold War-era thinking on Russia and lacks a roadmap on China. Partners will be concerned
L ast week, the newly elected president of the United States (US), Joe Biden, delivered his first foreign policy speech, with the aim of resetting America’s foreign policy agenda after four years of Donald Trump’s disruption. Biden’s choice of the State Department as the venue for his address was a show of support to the foreign service bureaucracy, and a signal to the world that standard diplomatic engagement and multilateralism would be the preferred mode of operation.
Announcing “America is back” and declaring the return of diplomacy in US foreign policy, Biden was perhaps hoping to underscore the divergences with his predecessor. But for all the rhetoric, the speech was a mélange of the Democratic Party’s standard talking points without a cohesive agenda for the changing global realities. The fact that China was hardly mentioned in his remarks and that Russia remained the obsession was also a reminder of how sections of the American establishment are still struggling to come to terms with the post-Cold War period.
Trying to strike an explicit contrast with Trump on Russia, Biden stated:
“I made it clear to President [Vladimir] Putin, in a manner very different from my predecessor, that the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions… are over.” Underlining his intent “to raise the cost to Russia and defend our vital interests,” Biden linked it to America’s democratic values and the need to rebuild “the muscles of democratic alliances that have atrophied from four years of neglect”. But the Trump administration, for all of Trump’s fondness for Putin, sanctioned Russia across the spectrum for the last four years. As such, it is not entirely clear what else Biden will be able to do.
Other major announcements from Biden included ending all support for Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations in Yemen, urging Myanmar’s military leaders to halt their coup, freezing troop redeployments from Germany, raising the cap for refugees allowed into the US from 15,000 for this fiscal year — the lowest since 1980 — to up to 125,000, and reaffirming US support for LGBTQ rights worldwide. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin is to conduct a “global force posture review” so as to ensure America’s “military footprint is appropriately aligned with our foreign policy and national security priorities”. Biden also underlined his administration’s recent decisions of elevating cyber by appointing the first national deputy security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, integrating climate as a central facet of national diplomacy, and rejoining the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement.
But some key issues were conspicuous either by their absence or in their framing. Iran was not mentioned, nor were the nuclear negotiations, while the broader “Middle East” geopolitical terrain was also not invoked, perhaps underscoring a shift away from the region for American foreign policy priorities.
And then there was China. Biden argued that America will confront Beijing’s “economic abuses, counter its aggressive, coercive action to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance”. But how this will be done, once again, remains in the realm of speculation. Biden is right that China’s President Xi Jinping doesn’t have “a democratic, small D, bone in his body” and his Secretary of State is also right in letting Beijing know that Washington “will continue to stand up for human rights and democratic values, including in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong”. But if the only instrumentality they can come up with is “international rules of the road”, then it doesn’t generate much confidence in Biden’s ability to shore up a credible posture vis-à-vis an increasingly confident China.
One area where Trump’s imprint remains palpable is in making American foreign policy viable for ordinary
Americans. On that, Biden was categorical: “There’s no longer a bright line between foreign and domestic policy. Every action taken in our conduct abroad, we must take with American working families in mind.” His national security adviser Jake Sullivan was equally emphatic when he suggested that “everything” the Biden administration does when it comes to foreign policy will be examined as to whether it makes life “better, safer and easier for working families,” arguing that US foreign policy has no chance of succeeding unless the middle class sees it advancing its own interests. So, for all the talk of America being back, its global footprint will be a function of the domestic consensus, which is fraying rapidly.
And as a consequence, America’s global interlocutors are left wondering what all the fuss is about of Biden bringing America back to the global stage. On Russia, there is no clarity on what Washington can do apart from its rhetorical flourishes. In Myanmar,
America’s sanctimonious calls for sanctions and isolation will only make China a more potent player. On China, where actually America’s leadership has been pretty strong under Trump, platitudes won’t work anymore. In the Indo-Pacific, regional powers have to respond to China’s rise in real-time. They have little time or patience for Biden’s inability to articulate a coherent China policy.
Biden’s first foreign policy speech was certainly in tune with the changing domestic political dynamic in the US. But its lack of a strategic vision will be concerning to America’s partners. For all his desire to forge a “united front” against Beijing, Biden has not been able to articulate a compelling vision of America’s role in the world so far. Strategic patience is in short supply around the world today.
YANGON: Large crowds demonstrating against the military coup in Myanmar again defied a ban on protests on Wednesday, even after security forces used force and raided the headquarters of the political party of ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Witnesses estimated that tens of thousands of protesters, if not more, turned out in Yangon and Mandalay, the country’s biggest cities. Anti-military rallies also took place in the capital Naypyitaw and elsewhere.
The protesters are demanding that power be restored to Suu Kyi’s deposed civilian government. They’re also seeking freedom for her and other governing party members since the military detained them on February 1. Some demonstrators in Yangon gathered at foreign embassies to seek international pressure against the coup.
Outside China’s embassy in Yangon, the pro-democracy protesters appealed directly to Chinese President Xi Jinping to withdraw his government’s support for the military. They pleaded with Xi to help reverse the coup, while others held signs reading “we are watching you” and “we know what you’re up to,” photographs taken by local media outlets showed.
Protesters also gathered in front of embassies of the US, Japan, Korea and India as well as the United Nations offices in an attempt to build international support for the return of a civilian government.
A small group outside the Japanese embassy held signs and chanted “We want democracy, we get dictators!” They sat in several children’s wading pools, three or fewer per pool, in what appeared to be a tongue-incheek way of showing compliance with an emergency law that bans gatherings of more than five people. Another group hauled a fake coffin as part of a mock funeral for Min Aung Hlaing, the military chief who is the country’s new leader.
NEW DELHI: Former ICICI Bank managing director Chanda Kochhar’s husband, Deepak, has questioned the independence and impartiality of the appellate tribunal for Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).
Deepak Kochhar, who is facing charges of money laundering, has said that the administrative control of the judicial tribunal is with the finance ministry, which is also the administrative ministry of the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which is investigating the case. Terming this “illegal, capricious and mala fide”, he has argued that it should come under the ministry of law.
Kochhar’s submission was made in a petition filed in the Delhi high court through his lawyer Vijay Aggarwal, and has been reviewed by HT.
The ministry of finance did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment.
The petition cites a Rajasthan high court judgement of January 28, which has directed the Centre to comply with the May 2010 judgement of the SC constitution bench in the matter of Union of India Vs R. Gandhi and Others (2010).
The apex court said in the judgement that “the administrative support for all tribunals should be from the ministry of law and justice. Neither the tribunals nor its members shall seek or be provided with facilities from the respective sponsoring or parent ministries or concerned departments.”
The Delhi high court has agreed to examine the matter issued notices to the Centre and the ED. The finance ministry’s department of revenue is a government arm, Aggarwal pointed out, and said that according to Article 50 of the Constitution of India, the State should take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive. Despite itself being a litigant before the appellate tribunal, Aggarwal has argued, ED controls it.
“There has been a consistent and constant effort of ministry of finance to keep the administrative control of the PMLA tribunal with itself despite directions from the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,” read the petition dated February 8, filed on behalf of Deepak Kochhar’s firm NuPower Wind Farms Ltd.
“The appellate tribunal constituted under the provisions of Section 25 of the PMLA is not an independent and impartial forum. Since the parent department of the sponsoring department i.e. Directorate of Enforcement (ED) is having the administrative control of the tribunal, it is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the appellate tribunal will not function in an independent and impartial manner.”
The petition further said that “such is the level of administrative control the Department of Revenue that not only the staff and judges of the PMLA appellate tribunal is appointed by it, but the very premises of the tribunal is in the headquarters of ED in New Delhi.”
ED has said in its charge sheet filed in November last year that both Chanda Kochhar and her husband worked in tandem as part of a conspiracy to disburse loans to Videocon group and then used an “elaborate structure/web of entities” for layering the bribe amount of ₹64 crore that they received.