THE CHINA CHALLENGE

China is a revisionist state. Having aggregated immense power, its economic and military might is now translating into coercive influence. In the east, China dominates the South China Sea, it routinely reminds Taiwan that it sees the latter as a renegade province and it continues to lock horns with Japan over the disputed island territories. In the west, with the restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang under control, China now feels that the time is ripe to assert its territorial claims along the Himalayas, with India and Bhutan.

While the eastern maritime regions remain its primary areas of concern, however, its western peripheries abutting South Asia act as a buffer to balance its quest to dominate the Indo-pacific region. This orientation, however, could abruptly change, given India’s steady rise, its recent intensification of its territorial claims, and the deepening Indo-us strategic ties and increased defence cooperation. In that sense, China and India are entangled in a long-drawn regional rivalry. Neither side is willing to defer to the other, as the current rivalry is rooted in a conflictual history and mutual distrust. These factors, no doubt, will fuel future strategic competition.

Asymmetric rivalry

The Sino-indian rivalry constitutes a budding strategic rivalry. Though there is often a tendency to focus on territorial issues, there is also a regional competition at play for dominance and influence in the region. Even if the territorial rivalry were to be resolved over time, the regional competition will continue to bedevil this relationship. Furthermore, the growing Sino-american strategic competition in the Asia-pacific feeds into this conflictual dynamic between China and India. In other words, the nature of Sino-indian rivalry is rife with uncertainty and risks, and hence prone to crisis and conflict.

Three scholars, Sumit Ganguly, Manjeet Pardesi and William R Thompson in a recent book, The Sinoindian Rivalry, argue that this rivalry is not only strategic, but also asymmetric. China outranks India on all reckonable indices of economic development, military modernisation, technologies and innovation by a factor of three to five, which complicates India’s longterm choices and options. Economic asymmetry is at the core of this rivalry. Although China is India’s largest trading partner, this relationship is marked by a broadening gap between the two economies and bilateral trade deficit, China’s expanding trade links with India’s South Asian neighbours, and its growing heft in niche technologies. The question is how best does a state with one fifth the material size of its adversary, match its rival on military capabilities at land, sea or air.

China is reportedly doubling its nuclear warhead arsenal. It is also making improvements in its missile capabilities and delivery systems. As China is addressing the larger gap with United States, India is finding it challenging to keep pace with China’s growing nuclear capabilities. In addition, the Sino-indian nuclear rivalry is linked to Indo-pakistan nuclear equation and its quest for parity with India. These inter-linkages, in turn, have led India to boost its quest for nuclear parity with China. These efforts may lead to the risk for inadvertent escalation along the Himalayan border. Furthermore, China has had a significant head start and more resources to commit to its space programme than what India does. Closing this gap will not be an easy task, but possibly India, with its techsavvy manpower, can catch up in key space applications such as remote sensing, imagery and communications.

Similarly, the material gaps in the land, sea and air forces are significant, with the Chinese military budget pegged at almost three times the Indian defence budget. For instance, the Indian navy is about one third the size of the current Chinese navy. And given the expansion plans of both navies till 2050, the Indian navy would still be about two-fifth the size of the Chinese navy. One can argue that India might not have to patrol the far seas, and as long as it dominates the

Indian ocean region and makes worthy contributions to efforts of like-minded naval partners in Asia, this comparison might not be in order. Notwithstanding that, if a brewing Sino-indian regional rivalry escalates into a military crisis, securing India’s territorial and maritime interests would remain a policy challenge.

Territorial contestation

From a military standpoint, while the regional rivalry is not insignificant, it is the territorial contestation that is more important at the moment. The past decade has witnessed several border incidents (2013, 2015, 2017 and 2020). Each one of these events had its own logic and triggers, indicating that border tensions remain a distinct possibility, and that the territorial issue continues to remain crucial to this rivalry.

The territorial rivalry can be explained at three levels. First, it is the complicated nature of our borders. The LAC is an elusive line prone to interpretations, perceptions, and sometimes even imagination. Consequently, the bordercontact between the opposing forces along this line have progressively become more skirmishprone and risky. Also, the four confidence-building agreements and protocols (1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013) are increasingly looking fragile and failing to assure peace and tranquillity. In fact, now the borders have become more susceptible to inadvertent or unilateral escalation. Till the borders are negotiated and defined, and demarcated on ground, the methodology to operate along this line would remain hostage to frequent infractions and violations, and even fatalities. A new agreement, which addresses the infirmities in the existing protocols, risktaking behaviour on both sides, use of new-age disruptive technologies and incorporates the new nuances of military confrontations such as disengagements, de-escalation and de-induction of troops, is the need of the hour.

Second, three developments characterize the PLA strategic behaviour along the LAC. The first is the eastwest expansion of road-rail infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang which provides for quick mobility to hinterland units. Second, lifesustaining troop infrastructure such as electricity, oil, water, habitat is now readily available to support PLA troops. Finally, the creation of a distinct joint theatre command in its western region now enables large-scale integrated employment of PLA forces under escalatory conditions.

All these developments allow the forward stationing of PLA reserves for instant application and response in crisis situations. In other words, it provides PLA the wherewithal and confidence to operate with much latitude in this inhospitable terrain and climatic conditions.

And third, the PLA has made clear of its territorial ambitions. Its strategy appears to be to assert its maximal claims one sector at a time, and use Indian responses as justifications for its build up, and thereafter mirror every Indian move with a comparable troop escalation. Once the standoff runs into a stalemate, the PLA issues calls to negotiate and then seek disengagement. In other words, winning without fighting is their prime objective, so we need to remain prepared to meet these border contingencies.

Consequently, it is vital to understand the underlying motivations of Chinese military behaviour. It no doubt considers the use of force as an effectual problem solver. However, it also believes that what can be achieved by way of bloodless jousts should remain an option. To that end, prior protocols and agreements can be set aside as convenient. Additionally, any adverse international opinion can be set aside through the use of deft propaganda.

Bridging the gap

To cope with this challenge, three aspects need to be considered. First, the current power asymmetry is pegged at three to five times in favour of China. Over the next two decades or so, this asymmetry could shift in either direction. If India does well, this gap might be reduced. However, if India faces headwinds and China maintains its course, this gap could increase. Either way, China is likely to retain a competitive edge, leaving India with difficult choices to catch up or cope with a rising and increasingly assertive China.

Second, it is important to assess India’s catch-up time with China. In this context, two timelines are significant. By 2035, China aims to be a fairly modernised state. And by 2049, it may be a leading power in Asia, with unmatched military and economic might, and along some dimensions a global power. Even if it is partly true, that leaves India with no more than a decade to catch up with China, otherwise it would be left to simply cope with a risen China. China could well telescope these timelines and leave India with little time to catch up.

Third and finally, bridging this strategic gap will, on India’s part, require astute political direction and internal cohesiveness and stability; sustained economic reforms and defence industrial growth; expansive military reforms and budgeting for the future force; and a clear understanding of India’s security strategy and the need to promulgate downstream strategic guidance. There are some signs that the country is pursuing these goals but these efforts need to be strengthened.

Military choices

From a military standpoint, building coherence in defence policies, posture and preparedness are the key challenges. While current debates are largely focussed on structural issues such as the theatre-isation of the armed forces and expedited arms acquisition, the real challenge lies in doctrinal convergence between the three armed services. Doctrinal coalescence alone can usher in the necessary reforms.

In the short term, a few steps are relevant. First, the armed forces need to ramp up the indigenous capacity for strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Second, we must bolster our strategic infrastructure along the Himalayas. Third, lifesustaining troop infrastructure such as high quality habitat, and basic amenities such as electricity, broadband connectivity, water and oil pipelines, etc, must be built into the strategic infrastructure. Fourth, identify and acquire weapon-platforms of asymmetric advantage that are most suited towards employment in extreme terrain and climatic conditions. Fifth, maintain high readiness levels among the border guarding troops in order to quickly respond to border infractions. Sixth and finally, recreate and position reserves that are not only lethal and agile, but lend to their timely employment.

Military readiness will come at a cost. However, if we make judicious policy choices, prioritising our military capability and readiness needs with limited resources is entirely doable. From a policy perspective, building a measurable military readiness framework that addresses the several dimensions of Chinese threat; desired military capabilities; and time required to acquire and deploy these capabilities is most important. In other words, we need a clear blueprint of how to build a ‘ready and relevant’ force for India’s northern borders.

From a military standpoint, while the regional rivalry is not insignificant, it is the territorial contestation that is more important at the moment