Fast-track problems
Govt must reform the entire judicial system, not slivers of it
The Supreme Court has directed the government to set up fasttrack courts that would try criminal cases involving politicians. This was in response to a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) petition that sought to debar anyone with a criminal conviction from participation in politics. The government submitted an affidavit to the court, saying that it would set up 12 special courts exclusively to address criminal cases against members of Parliament and legislative assemblies. This affidavit came in for some criticism in Parliament last week, with some MPs resented singling out politicians. In response to this concern, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said that politicians should be like “Caesar’s wife”, above reproach. But, while the minister’s point is well taken, and the intention of the government to introduce greater accountability and to depoliticise criminal accusations is worthy, the argument being made in favour of fast-track courts is ultimately unpersuasive.
In general, India’s experience with fast-track courts is that they work only up to a point. For one, there is genuine concern that existing fast-track courts are more susceptible to having their verdicts overturned on appeal. If so, expanding their number and scope would look like institutionalising the miscarriage of justice. It is also important to note that there are already multiple experiments with fast-track courts that have not materially changed the quality of justice available in India. The first such fast-track courts were introduced in 2000, following a suggestion from the Eleventh Finance Commission. At that point, 1,734 fast-track courts were set up to help clear pending cases, which were choking the judicial system. Their tenure was extended in 2005 and yet again in 2010. However, they did not make as much headway as was hoped in fixing the problem of pendency. After the horrific Delhi gang rape of December 2012, an attempt to reform the prosecution of crimes against women led to a commitment that rape trials would be completed in two months — which again required fast-track courts. Here, too, the record has been nothing to write home about. Thus, it is far from clear that the history of fast-track courts in India should inspire confidence about their effectiveness or even their quality as compared to the regular court system.
Experience aside, fast-track courts can be questioned even in terms of principle. Justice should have no favourites. What is needed is for the regular justice system to work more swiftly and surely. What needs to be done here is known, although it has not been implemented. Administrative reform of the courts and professionalisation of their management is an important first step. Judicial appointments should be stepped up, and funding should not be as constrained as is the case at present. The overburdened justice system should not be cannibalised for fast-track courts just because certain cases make more news or are more politically relevant. Instead, all cases should be addressed more speedily. By setting up fast-track courts whenever a particular problem is brought to its notice, the government is ducking its greater responsibility to reform the trial system overall.