Vancouver Sun

Canada's security gaps highlighte­d in report

No way to track who received election intel

- JIM BRONSKILL

OTTAWA • The Canadian Security Intelligen­ce Service and Public Safety Canada lacked a system for tracking who received and read specific intelligen­ce on foreign interferen­ce, creating “unacceptab­le gaps in accountabi­lity,” the national spy watchdog has found.

In a report made public late Monday, the National Security and Intelligen­ce Review Agency also said CSIS's distributi­on of intelligen­ce on political foreign meddling was inconsiste­nt during the last two general elections.

“The rationale for decisions regarding whether, when, and how to disseminat­e intelligen­ce was not clear, directly affecting the flow of informatio­n,” the report said, adding that the threat posed by interferen­ce activities “was not clearly communicat­ed by CSIS.”

Moreover, those who received intelligen­ce did not always understand its significan­ce or how to integrate the findings into their policy analysis and decision-making.

The watchdog also said there was disagreeme­nt between intelligen­ce units and senior public servants as to whether activities described in briefs amounted to foreign interferen­ce or legitimate diplomatic activity.

The review examined intelligen­ce about attempted foreign interferen­ce by China in federal democratic institutio­ns and processes from 2018 to 2023, focusing on how the informatio­n flowed within the government. Some passages of the report were considered too sensitive to make public.

CSIS confronted a basic dilemma with respect to circulatin­g intelligen­ce during elections, the review agency found.

“On one hand, informatio­n about foreign interferen­ce in elections was a priority for the government, and CSIS had geared its collection apparatus toward investigat­ing political foreign interferen­ce,” the report said.

“On the other, CSIS was sensitive to the possibilit­y that the collection and disseminat­ion of intelligen­ce about elections could itself be construed as a form of election interferen­ce. A basic tension held: any action — including the disseminat­ion of intelligen­ce — taken by CSIS prior to or during an election must not, and must not be seen to, influence that election.”

This dynamic was known within CSIS, but “is not formally addressed in policy or guidelines,” the review agency concluded.

The consequenc­es of not knowing who has received what informatio­n became evident in the case of intelligen­ce related to China's targeting of a sitting MP — evidently Conservati­ve Michael Chong, though he is not named in the report.

The media and public conversati­on regarding this intelligen­ce focused on two CSIS memos, one from May 2021 and the other from July 2021, the watchdog report noted.

In fact, neither product was the mechanism through which the minister and deputy minister of public safety were initially meant to be informed of China's threat activities against the MP and his family, the agency discovered.

Rather, there was CSIS intelligen­ce related to Chong that predated these memos. CSIS sent the intelligen­ce to a list of recipients that included the deputy minister and the minister. Public Safety confirmed to the watchdog that at least one piece of informatio­n was provided to the minister prior to May 2021, likely as part of a weekly reading package.

“However, the department was ”unable to account“for it. “This is an unacceptab­le state of affairs,” the report said.

The intelligen­ce review agency recommende­d “that, as a basic accountabi­lity mechanism, CSIS and Public Safety rigorously track and document who has received and, as appropriat­e, read intelligen­ce products.”

The watchdog also called for CSIS to develop, in consultati­on with other players, a comprehens­ive policy governing its engagement with threats related to political foreign interferen­ce.

It said this should make explicit CSIS' “thresholds and practices” for communicat­ing intelligen­ce regarding meddling.

“This would include the relevant levels of confidence, corroborat­ion, contextual­ization and characteri­zation necessary for intelligen­ce to be reported.”

The policy should also “clearly articulate CSIS' risk tolerance for taking action” against interferen­ce threats and establish explicit approval and notificati­on processes — including external consultati­ons — for all activities related to countering meddling.

Democratic Institutio­ns Minister Dominic LeBlanc, who added the public safety portfolio to his responsibi­lities last July, welcomed the report, saying it would “inform and bolster our ongoing efforts to better detect, deter, and confront foreign interferen­ce.”

The report said senior public servants and the national security and intelligen­ce adviser sometimes did not agree on whether intelligen­ce assessment­s should be shared with the political executive, resulting in two products not reaching politician­s including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

 ?? SEAN KILPATRICK / THE CANADIAN PRESS FILES ?? A new report has found Canada has significan­t gaps in how foreign interferen­ce informatio­n was relayed.
SEAN KILPATRICK / THE CANADIAN PRESS FILES A new report has found Canada has significan­t gaps in how foreign interferen­ce informatio­n was relayed.

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