My Worries About Taiwan

Michael Mullen, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, is concerned enough about the risk of war between the United States and China that he has been listening to the audiobook of Barbara Tuchman’s “The Guns of August,” the classic history of how the major powers in 1914 stumbled into World War I.

“I think this is the most dangerous time since I was a kid in 1962,” during the Cuban missile crisis, he told me. “The world war potential is really, really significant.”

I went to Taiwan to gauge that risk and assess how to manage it better. I greatly respect Admiral Mullen, but my best guess is that Americans may be overestimating the risk of conflict, particularly of an all-out invasion of Taiwan by China.

Moreover, I worry that American anxiety about the risk of war with China may inadvertently exacerbate it. “The Guns of August” is a useful prism for reminding us how miscalculation, misunderstanding and escalation created a world war that no one wanted. So Americans should be alert to the risk they unintentionally pose — the possibility that their legitimate efforts to confront China can lead to accidents at sea or air that lead to war.

My take is that while America should do significantly more to help Taiwan boost defenses and deter aggression, it should do so quietly, without needlessly humiliating China. Sometimes Americans loudly embrace Taiwan in ways that inflame tensions, when they should be hoping to lower them.

Let me also make the case that Americans think too much in terms of an invasion — when the greater risk may be China’s taking lesser nibbles to pressure Taiwan, leading to the possibility of accidents and escalation that could drag the U.S. into an unintended world war.

It is disorienting to go from talking to American security experts to Taiwan, where most people seem to perceive the risks of war with China as lower. Taiwan’s outgoing president, Tsai Ing-wen, has said that China was probably too overwhelmed with domestic problems to take on an invasion.

Many prominent people in Taiwan told me that while they appreciate American moral and military support, they also fear that hotheaded, China-bashing Americans do not understand the region and may make things worse.

Efforts to help sometimes backfire. One example often comes up in Taiwan: Nancy Pelosi’s high-profile visit in 2022, when she was speaker of the House of Representatives. It was a gesture of moral support, but it did not obviously boost Taiwan’s defenses. And China’s response was to move military ships closer to Taiwan in ways that increase the risk of conflict. Sixty-two percent of Taiwanese said in a poll last year that they thought the Pelosi visit had made Taiwan less secure.

Just as American officials read fiery speeches by Chinese officials and grow alarmed, imagine what Chinese leaders thought when an American Air Force general, Michael Minihan, declared last year that he anticipated war with China soon: “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.”

Beijing must also have been unnerved when Ely Ratner, a senior U.S. Defense Department official, described Taiwan as a strategic asset for the United States. The implication was that America may try to use Taiwan as a military bulwark against China; such comments aggravate the paranoia in Beijing.

Instead, the U.S. needs to solidify the status quo. That means China does not use military force against Taiwan, and Taiwan is not seen as slipping away forever into America’s orbit. Taiwanese officials, including President-elect Lai Chingte, are prudent enough to say they will maintain that status quo — messy and unsatisfactory though it is — and Washington should as well.

But perhaps the best way to discourage Xi Jinping from attacking Taiwan is to help Ukraine against Russia. The more the West is united in making Russia pay a stiff price for Vladimir Putin’s invasion, the less inclined Xi will be to take a whack at Taiwan. Yet some Republicans resist funding for Ukraine.

President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has done an excellent job in leading the Western alliance against Putin. But he let himself be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, especially early in the war, refusing to provide some advanced arms to Ukraine for fear that Putin would respond with tactical nuclear weapons. Xi may thus have absorbed the lesson that nuclear threats work.

Granted, my argument that the risk of war is overblown may be wrong. A rule of thumb in following China is always to distrust people who assert with confidence what will happen. There are legitimate reasons to fear what China might do.

“Xi Jinping has been different from his predecessors in how he talks about Taiwan, in ways that we would be unwise to ignore,” noted Matt Pottinger, who was deputy national security adviser under President Donald Trump. Xi has shown greater urgency about “recovering” Taiwan, and has linked this to his legacy, while matching his talk with a military modernization that targets Taiwan and the United States.

Also ominous: The Times has reported that China appears to have inserted malware into computer networks that operate electrical grids, telecommunications and water supplies that serve United States bases, including those that would respond to an attack on Taiwan.

Yet the basic reason to be skeptical that war is coming is that it is not in China’s interest or Xi’s (although it is also true that plenty of nations have started wars that did not serve their interests).

An amphibious operation to conquer Taiwan might well

Some well-meaning U.S. efforts could tragically backfire.

fail. Taiwan is nearly 160 kilometers from China, without many beaches to offer easy landing. A surprise invasion would not be feasible in an age of satellites and drones.

China’s military is inexperienced — the People’s Liberation Army’s last “combat” came when it fired on fellow citizens during the 1989 pro-democracy protests — and deeply corrupt. Well-connected Chinese friends have told me how officers are regularly promoted based on the bribes they pay. Xi is a risk taker, but even he must know that an all-out invasion would be a dangerous gamble.

“Just out of prudence, I think he’s unlikely to do something in the next few years as the alarmists have been promoting in Washington,” said Joseph Nye, a retired Harvard University professor with long experience in Pacific strategy.

One step that might make Chinese aggression more likely to succeed — and thus a greater possibility — is a Trump victory in November. Trump has expressed uncertainty about helping Taiwan, and it is difficult to imagine him coordinating allies to press China to back off.

The Biden administration has worked very effectively with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines to prepare for joint action to constrain China. That enhances deterrence. Washington could also do more to help Taiwan cultivate cyberwarfare: If the electric grid goes out in Taipei, Shanghai should lose power, too.

Maybe the best recommendation I heard came from Mark Liu, the chairman of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. He offered this advice for Americans aiming to help Taiwan: “Do more. Talk less.”

That might have helped the major powers in 1914 avoid a cataclysmic and unnecessary war. It remains sound counsel today.