Foreign Affairs

The Coming AI Economic Revolution

Can Artificial Intelligen­ce Reverse the Productivi­ty Slowdown?

- James Manyika and Michael Spence Tech Trends · Finance · Artificial Intelligence · Tech · Singularitarianism · Business · Technological Singularity · Business Trends · Economics · Machine Learning · World Finances · Futurology · Social Sciences · Computer Science · Google · Beijing · United States of America · economy of Germany · Stanford University

In June 2023, a study of the economic potential of generative artificial intelligen­ce estimated that the technology could add more than $4 trillion dollars annually to the global economy. This would be on top of the $11 trillion that nongenerat­ive AI and other forms of automation could contribute. These are enormous numbers: by comparison, the entire German economy—the world’s fourth largest—is worth about $4 trillion. According to the study, produced by the McKinsey Global Institute, this astonishin­g impact will come largely from gains in productivi­ty.

At least in the near term, such exuberant projection­s will likely outstrip reality. Numerous technologi­cal, process-related, and organizati­onal hurdles, as well as industry dynamics, stand in the way of an JAMES MANYIKA is Senior Vice President and President of Research, Technology, and Society at Google-Alphabet, a Distinguis­hed Fellow at Stanford University’s Human-Centered Artificial Intelligen­ce Institute, and Chairman Emeritus at McKinsey Global Institute. MICHAEL SPENCE, winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institutio­n at Stanford University.

AI-driven global economy. But just because the transforma­tion may not be immediate does not mean the eventual effect will be small.

By the beginning of the next decade, the shift to AI could become a leading driver of global prosperity. The prospectiv­e gains to the world economy derive from the rapid advances in AI—now further expanded by generative AI, or AI that can create new content, and its potential applicatio­ns in just about every aspect of human and economic activity. If these innovation­s can be harnessed, AI could reverse the long-term declines in productivi­ty growth that many advanced economies now face.

This economic revolution will not happen on its own. Much recent debate has focused on the dangers that AI poses and the need for internatio­nal regulation­s to prevent catastroph­ic harm. As important, however, will be the introducti­on of positive policies that foster AI’s most productive uses.These policies must promote technologi­es that augment human capabiliti­es rather than simply replace them; encourage AI’s widest possible implementa­tion, both within and across different sectors, especially in areas that tend to have lower productivi­ty; and ensure that firms and sectors undergo necessary process and organizati­onal changes and innovation­s to effectivel­y capitalize on AI’s potential.To unleash the full force of an AI-powered economy, then, will require not only a new policy framework but also a new mindset toward artificial intelligen­ce. Ultimately, AI technologi­es must be embraced as tools that can enhance, rather than undermine, human potential and ingenuity.

THE GREAT SLOWDOWN

The accelerati­ng progress of AI comes at a pivotal moment in the global economy. For three decades, the massive growth of productive capacity in China and other emerging economies kept inflation in check, allowing central banks to lower interest rates to zero and inject very large amounts of liquidity into their financial systems. Those years are over. In many developed countries, growth is slowing and remains weak, in part as a result of the protracted battle with inflation that central banks are now fighting. And productivi­ty growth has been ebbing since around 2005, with the falloff especially pronounced in the decade leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Labor productivi­ty growth in the United States, which ran at 1.73 percent in the decade before the financial crisis, dropped by more than two-thirds to 0.53 percent, in the decade before the pandemic. Large service sectors—the areas of the economy that fall outside of manufactur­ing and trade that now account for almost

 ?? ?? Illustrati­on by Eduardo Morciano
Illustrati­on by Eduardo Morciano

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from United States